Galrahn over at Information Dissemination provides a slightly technical but extremely readable account of why the U.S. Navy’s grand strategy and deployment plans are out of sync with the capabilities it is fielding, and how it is tailoring the strategy to justify its procurement of the Littoral Combat Ship rather than starting from strategy and building platforms to suit. (“Questionable Assumptions“)
I am a longtime Navy booster, but I have become discouraged in recent years by the Pentagon’s failure to procure and field ships (especially surface combatants of any size) that are capable of achieving their mission in a timely, economical manner. It is enough to make me pine for the days of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates, despite their design limitations.
Ignoring the program’s teething pains in coming up to operational readiness, Galrahn offers us a chapter and verse listing of the strategic issues surrounding the LCS and its capabilities. This is a discussion that should concern every American taxpayer, regardless of political persuasion, because it cuts to the heart of the massive procurement dysfunction in the Pentagon.
- The Navy Needs to Get Leaner and Meaner (pacificbullmoose.wordpress.com)
- Policy Forum: “The Future of the U.S. Navy Surface Fleet” | May 21 @ 12:00 pm (cato.org)
- What the LCS should be… (xbradtc.wordpress.com)
- Failed Equipment, Flawed Designs Plague Lockheed Littoral Combat Ship (pogoblog.typepad.com)
- The Battle over the Navy’s “Swiss Army Knife” Ship (pogoblog.typepad.com)
- US Navy: ‘Hollow’ force or ‘the best in the world’? (security.blogs.cnn.com)
- Information Dissemination: The Politics of Fleet Constitution (xbradtc.wordpress.com)